The Cassini spacecraft has been in orbit around Saturn since July 1, 2004. To remain on the planned trajectory which maximizes science data return, Cassini must perform orbit trim maneuvers using either its main engine or its reaction control system thrusters. Over 200 maneuvers have been executed on the spacecraft since arrival at Saturn. To improve performance and maintain spacecraft health, changes have been made in maneuver design command placement, in accelerometer scale factor, and in the pre-aim vector used to align the engine gimbal actuator prior to main engine burn ignition. These and other changes have improved maneuver performance execution errors significantly since 2004. A strategy has been developed to decide whether a main engine maneuver should be performed, or whether the maneuver can be executed using the reaction control system.
Since Saturn insertion in 2004, Cassini has executed over 200 maneuvers to impart ΔV to the spacecraft. About 90 maneuvers have been cancelled, mostly due to small delivery errors although some "clean-up" and "targeting" OTMs are merged into a single maneuver. Omission of planned maneuvers, at certain key times, could cause Cassini to "fall off the reference trajectory". Such an event would mean failure to return to Titan and therefore the spacecraft would become stuck in a single Saturn-relative orbit, invalidating all future plans for science observation. Backup and contingency maneuver plans exist to impart ΔV to avoid such a fate, even at the expense of significant extra propellant usage.
Since targeting to return to Titan is basic to the design of the mission, it does happen that after a flyby the spacecraft can actually be on an "impactor" trajectory. This means that if no additional ΔV is imparted during the next orbit, the spacecraft would collide with Titan during the next flyby. The normal process for ground engineers is to execute a ΔV maneuver, usually 3 days after the prior flyby, to move the spacecraft off the impactor trajectory in as efficient a manner as possible. Again, the essential goal is to keep Cassini near the reference trajectory.
All science and engineering activities onboard Cassini are accomplished via stored sequences of commands. These commands are time-ordered set of commands to accomplish a wide variety of activities. Each command is issued at a planned UTC time. Since science observations, especially their desired "pointing" are designed to occur at an exact UTC time, maneuver design must keep the spacecraft near the reference in both space and time. Most science and engineering activities are merged into a "background sequence". Each b/g sequence is typically 6 to 10 weeks in duration, and is uplinked to the spacecraft about 5 days before it is scheduled to begin execution. A b/g sequence undergoes a series of simulations and ground software checks to insure it will execute seamlessly once onboard 5 . A whole series of flight rule checks are performed by the Cassini attitude control ground operations team. All pointing commands, for example, must meet limitations on maximum slew rates and accelerations, avoiding "keep out" zones, and thermal constraints.
One important keep out zone that must be met, even during ΔV maneuvers, is the limit on RWA wheel speed. Each RWA can spin up to 2020 revolutions per minute, but this hard limit must not be exceeded. If this restriction is not followed, onboard fault protection will autonomously keep the RWA spin rate from exceeding the hard limit, and at the same time it will issue a safe mode command. Safing causes an autonomous transition to RCS control, powers off the RWAs as well as many science instruments, and suspends the execution of any onboard sequence (including ΔV maneuver sequences). Recovery from safe mode is complex and time-consuming for ground operators, so constraints of this type are always high-priority checks during any ΔV maneuver development.
Another constraint important for long-term RWA health and safety is to minimize any dwell at a low RWA wheel speed. Cassini flight experience has shown that large and persistent RWA bearing frictional toruqe spikes can occur if an RWA dwells at a very low spin rate. Excessive dwell time could lead to RWA bearing failure over time. During the approach to Jupiter in late 2000, fault protection autonomously transitioned to RCS control due to large frictional torque when an RWA dwelled near zero rpm for several hours.
A b/g sequence is designed to accommodate ΔV maneuvers, but the commands to perform maneuvers are typically uplinked long after the b/g sequence is already onboard. Orbit determination and maneuver design require very "up to date" radiometric data, especially for any events on the spacecraft that impart ΔV. A typical 'day" for the Cassini spacecraft is to gather science data for 15 hours, and then turn the spacecraft to align the HGA with Earth for 9 hours of playback. It is these standard Earth-pointed time periods that serve as ΔV maneuver "windows". If no maneuver is needed, the window is used for data playback (some science is gathered even during playback). If a ΔV maneuver is required, the maneuver pauses the playback until the maneuver is complete.
A ΔV maneuver is usually uplinked on the same 9-hour DSN uplink/downlink window over which the maneuver is to take place. The nominal strategy is to design burn ignition time to be six hours into the 9 hour OTM window. Thus the maneuver sequence is usually uplinked at the beginning of the track and stored onboard for only a few hours before it begins execution. A standard practice is to always plan for the loss (for example, high winds or rain at the station) of the prime DSN uplink/downlink window and always prepare a backup maneuver that will be uplinked on the next available DSN window. The maneuver team builds and checks this backup maneuver just like the nominal maneuver. Typically, the backup maneuver is slightly less efficient than the prime maneuver, meaning that a slightly bigger ΔV would be required to keep the trajectory close to the reference trajectory.
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III. Roll/Yaw Turn Design for Maneuvers
The basic approach to maneuver design was conceived prior to launch 6 . When Cassini was in the inner solar system, it was important to keep the HGA pointed at the Sun and to keep the thermally-sensitive +X side of the spacecraft at least 90º from the Sun. To impart ΔV in the correct inertial direction, the spacecraft must be slewed from the initial attitude to an attitude that aligns the thrust vector with the desired ΔV direction. Rather than a single multi-spacecraft-axis turn to the burn attitude (which could violate the thermal requirements), a two-turn approach called the "roll/yaw" turn strategy was developed. The first turn is a turn about the spacecraft Z-axis (a "roll" turn between -180 degrees and +180 degrees). This turn keeps the Sun 90º away from the +X body axis. The second turn is a turn about the spacecraft Y-axis (a "yaw" turn between 0 degrees and -180 degrees). A yaw turn that has a negative angle insures that the +X-to-Sun angle never drops below 90º during the maneuver. Science camera boresights are coaligned with the spacecraft -Y body axis. This roll/yaw turn strategy also insures that these boresights remain 90º or more away from the Sun.
During the Saturn tour phase of the mission, HGA-to-Earth is used as the initial and final attitude, rather than HGA-to-Sun. The roll/yaw turn strategy is still used, however, and provides adequate thermal protection, even though the +X-to-Sun angle can drop below 90º. At Saturn, from the perspective of the spacecraft, the angle between the Earth and the Sun is always less than 7º. Thus the smallest the +X-to-Sun angle can get (at any time during the maneuver -including during the slews) is: 90º -7º or 83º. This can cause some heating on the science instruments, but the science teams have accepted this and there is approximately 2-3 hours of "cool down" time after the maneuver before the spacecraft turns towards targets of science interest.
The roll/yaw turn strategy during Saturn tour also tends to minimize the time spent "off-Earth". The spacecraft remains Earth-pointed during the "wind" roll turn and begins to move "off-Earth" at the start of the wind yaw turn. Following the burn, an "unwind" yaw turn in the opposite direction returns the spacecraft to Earth-point. This is followed by the unwind roll turn to return to the initial spacecraft attitude. Propellant slosh settling time is added in between turns and after the burn.
This strategy is followed for all burns, whether ME or RCS. The thrusters used for Delta V during RCS burns are the four thrusters co-aligned with the spacecraft -Z body axis. Thus the effective "thrust vector" for RCS burns can be considered to be the -Z body axis. The main engine is physically mounted about 24 cm away from the Zaxis spacecraft "centerline" (in the +Y-axis direction). Since the Y-component of the spacecraft center-of-mass is very near the "centerline" and the distance from the center-of-mass to the main engine gimbal is about 2.2 meters, the effective "thrust vector" during ME burns makes an angle of about 6 degrees with the -Z-axis. The roll/yaw turn strategy aligns the spacecraft "pre-aim" thrust vector with the desired Delta V vector for the burn. There is a unique closed-form solution for the roll and yaw turn angles for all burn directions. This algorithm has been used for all burns since launch (excepting Saturn Orbit Insertion which had unique requirements).
IV. Main Engine Maneuvers
Science and engineering activities on Cassini require a series of commands that are tailored for each activity long before the activity is uplinked. Unique command arguments are selected as well as the absolute UTC time of the activity. Because most activities follow a standard pattern, ground-expanded blocks are used throughout the Cassini project and are especially useful during maneuvers. The maneuver block is the time-ordered sequence of commands that are always issued during a maneuver.
The Cassini main engine ΔV block has evolved throughout the mission. The block is like the skeleton of commands and inputs to the block include the burn-specific parameters like burn magnitude, minimum and maximum burn timers, burn direction, turn rates and accelerations, mass properties, pre-aim vector, RWA momentum, attitude control deadbands. The ground system "expands" the block input parameters into a timeordered sequence of commands, ready for uplink. Many automated checks are performed on the maneuver products and any flight rule or other violations are flagged 7 . The specific set of block parameters have evolved over the course of the mission. An important lesson is to avoid "overlays" to the block. Manual overlays introduce increased risk of parameter mistakes or command placement mistakes.
Before reaching Saturn, maneuvers used 50 to 100 grams of hydrazine during the turns to the burn attitude and back. For these maneuvers, the wind and unwind roll and yaw turns were performed in RCS control. To minimize hydrazine usage, the wind roll and unwind roll turns on all ME maneuvers since arrival at Saturn have been American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 6 performed in RWA control. The yaw turns for ME burns are done in RCS control, but the turn rate and acceleration are kept small in order to reduce hydrazine usage. The nominal yaw rate is 1.1 mrad/s and nominal yaw acceleration is 0.02 mrad/s 2 . The project considered doing ME yaw turns in RWA control, but decided that there would be very small propellant savings given that these turns in RCS control are performed at small turn rates.
A disadvantage of performing ME burn yaw turns in RWA control is that the RWAs would have to either be left spinning during the burn, or spun down at the burn attitude. There were risks associated with leaving the RWAs spinning during the burn. These included a power-related impedance issue when the RWAs were on and the main engine valve was actuated at burn ignition, and the risk to the RWAs themselves (shock and vibration) if spinning at the time of main engine ignition.
If the RWAs were spun down (requiring 15 to 20 minutes) at the burn attitude, then spun back up after the burn (requiring an additional 15 to 20 minutes), this would add significant "off-Earth" time where ground engineers cannot monitor performance real-time and the navigation team loses visibility into the Delta V effects of the RWA spin down and spin up. Vibration effects on the RWA hardware was another factor in favor of performing the unwind yaw turn in RCS control. The spacecraft is jolted by the main engine valve opening and burn ignition. Flight data from OTM-21 is given in Fig. 5 . Even when the unwind yaw turn is performed in RCS control, when RWA control was commanded about 30 minutes after the burn, significant RWA torque "roughness" was observed in all 3 axes and took many additional minutes to settle down. In the Z-axis, the torque roughness sometimes reached 60 milli-Nm, peak-to-peak. The cause of this vibration is likely residual oscillations in the MAG boom or the RPWS booms, although propellant sloshing could also contribute. To minimize having the RWAs experience this roughness, the ME OTM block was adjusted to allow a selectable additional settling time after the unwind yaw turn, before returning to RWA control. Fig. 6 shows RWA torque during a later OTM that had this extra settling time. The peak-to-peak torque roughness is now reduced to 20 milli-Nm or less. 
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All main engine OTMs at Saturn have used the hardware accelerometer to sense accumulated ΔV during the burn. Burn cutoff is commanded when the desired ΔV magnitude is achieved. Prior to each main engine burn, a one-minute accelerometer calibration is performed. During the calibration, the ACC output accumulates for 60 seconds in a zero-g condition. The accumulated "counts" of the ACC (N ACC ) and the flight software estimate of the ACC scale factor (SF ACC ) are used by the flight software to compute a new estimate for the 60-second accelerometer bias calibration: ACC Bias (mm/s 2 ) = (N ACC x SF ACC ) / 60. This measured bias is then used during the burn to estimate burn acceleration. The ACC bias trending has shown very good stability over the course of the mission. The ACC bias varied from a "nominal" value of 2.7 mm/s 2 by up to 10% early in the mission, but since arrival at Saturn the variation has been only about 1% from the nominal value. This reduced variation could be due to the more stable thermal environment at Saturn.
The ACC scale factor is a flight software parameter that is closely related to main engine burn execution error. Burn execution error is a measure of how closely the spacecraft achieves the desired ΔV. The ability to accurately achieve the desired ΔV is a vital aspect of Cassini mission operations and planning. For example, if ME burn ΔV execution was only accurate to 5%, the mission would have used up all of its bi-propellant years ago. If burn execution was perfect, there would be more propellant available and the mission might have lasted beyond 2017. There are a lot of factors that contribute to burn execution error, one of the most important being how accurate the on-board estimation of accumulated ΔV is. Another is the pre-ignition alignment of the engine gimbal to minimize the attitude transient that occurs after ME burn ignition. And of course orienting the spacecraft in the desired inertial direction for the burn and controlling the spacecraft attitude throughout the burn are also key to achieved burn execution.
Since ΔV is a vector quantity, burn execution error has a magnitude and a direction. The magnitude error is referred to as an underburn if the achieved ΔV is less than the desired ΔV. An overburn means the achieved ΔV is greater than the desired ΔV. The achieved magnitude could be precisely correct, but if its direction is significantly different from the desired direction, the resulting pointing error causes the spacecraft to move away from its intended trajectory. For example, a large pointing execution error from one burn might cause the next burn to be bigger than it needs to be, in order to correct for the deviating trajectory. Accurately trending execution error is vital to both planning the rest of the mission and to insuring valuable consumables are available to support it. For example, after about 18 months at Saturn and about 24 ME burns had been performed, execution error trending showed that, on average, the achieved velocity magnitude tended to be about 0.06% bigger than the ideal. To correct for this, a flight software patch was developed to increase the FSW estimate of the ACC scale factor by this amount. As a result, subsequent ME burns were even closer to the targeted burn velocity magnitude. In 2009, after another 50 ME burns, it was decided to slightly reduce the ACC scale factor by 0.02% because execution error trending showed that ME burns were slightly underburning on average. 
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The Cassini Navigation team is responsible for estimating the achieved ΔV for a burn, in fact for any ΔV event on the spacecraft. They use a sophisticated orbit determination model in conjuction with precise radiometric Doppler and range tracking of the spacecraft to estimate both the spacecraft's flight path and the achieved burn ΔV. Other inputs to the navigation model include optical (camera-based) navigation data from Cassini itself as well as FSW ΔV telemetry which is played back after every maneuver. Decisions are routinely made about upcoming maneuver plans, possible maneuver omission (cancellation), etc. based on the Navigation team's latest orbit determination results. The Navigation team produces a preliminary estimate of the maneuver execution error within hours to days of a maneuver but their final estimate of execution error takes several weeks or more to fully evaluate the effects of the maneuver on the downstream trajectory.
Main engine ΔV burns at Saturn range from 0.3 m/s up to about 40 m/s or more in magnitude. Execution error is expressed as a magnitude error and a pointing error. The magnitude error (V MAG ) can be considered a vector parallel to the direction of the desired ΔV direction (V CMD ). If the magnitude error points in the same direction as V CMD , this indicates an underburn where the convention is V MAG is considered negative for an underburn. An overburn is depicted as V MAG in the opposite direction of V CMD , where the scalar magnitude of V MAG is a positive quantity.
The pointing error for ME burns can be depicted in two ways. One way is to find the angle between the achieved ΔV vector and the commanded V CMD target. Another way is to construct a pointing error vector V PTG normal to V CMD . The pointing error V PTG has a magnitude that expresses how far away the achieved ΔV vector is from the commanded ΔV direction. Fig. 7 depicts the relationship between these vectors and how V MAG and V PTG can be constructed. Figure 8 depicts magnitude percentage error as a function of burn magnitude ΔV for all ME burns at Saturn. The Y-axis is V MAG / V CMD expressed as a percentage. Very short burns tend to result in larger percentage magnitude errors than longer burns. The uncertainty in ME tailoff impulse tends to be bigger in short burns and the flight software assumes a fixed tailoff impulse. Until 2009, the flight software assumed a tailoff impulse consistent with maximum thrust achieved during pressurized burns. Since virtually all ME burns are now "blow down" burns without pressure regulation in the bi-propellant tanks, the achieved thrust and tailoff impulse tend to be smaller as the ullage pressure slowly decreases. The tailoff impulse parameter in the flight software was updated to a smaller value in 2009. Other reasons for greater magnitude percentage error for short burns include variation in post-cutoff RCS thruster firings for attitude control. Spacecraft body rates at cutoff tend to be larger for short burns because the Main engine pointing execution error is depicted in Fig. 9 with pointing error magnitude percentage is plotted against burn magnitude ΔV. Short burns also tend to have greater percentage pointing errors than longer burns.
All ME burns tend to be more accurate if the main engine pre-aim vector is accurately chosen. The pre-aim vector is used to pre-position the engine gimbal towards the approximate center-of-mass of the spacecraft. It is also used to orient the entire spacecraft at the burn attitude so that the thrust vector points in the desired ΔV direction. AACS analysts use thrust vector telemetry from the most recent ME burn to select the pre-aim vector for the next burn. Non-linear elements in the main engine actuator gimbal assembly cause a .04 Hz limit cycle oscillation in the thrust vector telemetry as seen in Fig. 10 . This oscillation is also seen in other telemetry dynamical parameters (for example, Y-axis attitude control error). Trying to construct a pre-aim vector from burn telemetry that does not span at least one complete oscillation will introduce an error. Normally, an average of the last one or two complete American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics oscillations (spanning roughly 25 or 50 seconds) of thrust vector telemetry of the most recent ME burn is used to estimate the pre-aim vector for the next burn. If the burn duration does not span at least 25 seconds, AACS analysts do not update the pre-aim vector.
The trend in the pre-aim vector as bi-propellant is slowly depleted over the years tends to track the changing center of mass of the entire spacecraft. The spacecraft center of mass was not measured pre-launch and is estimated based on a summation of many different "elements" (for example, the magnetometer boom, the main engines, the reaction wheels, etc.) including the amount of bi-propellant and hydrazine remaining. The mass properties of each element was estimated pre-launch in the spacecraft structural frame. A standard product for each OTM is the current estimated total spacecraft mass, center-of-mass, and inertia matrix, based on this analytical summation of elements as a function of propellant remaining. Figure 11 plots the spacecraft body X-axis and Y-axis components of the pre-aim unit vector history since late 2004 and the equivalent components of a unit vector from the main engine gimbal center to the estimated center-ofmass (computed for that OTM). Although they have similar trends, there is a 11 to 15 mrad difference between the two vectors at any given time. This offset is roughly consistent with a known pointing misalignment of the rocket engine assembly. Review of pre-launch inclinometer test data showed that a misalignment of approximately 0.9 degrees was noted on the ground for the prime flight rocket engine assembly. A pointing error of about 15 mrad was reconstructed after the Cassini Deep Space Maneuver in December of 1998. Rather than attempt a risky update to complicated coordinate frame transformations in the Cassini flight software, it was decided to compensate for this misalignment, for all ME burns after December 1998, by performing a small 0.9 degree turn to adjust the commanded burn attitude a few minutes before each ME burn ignition. This small turn has been performed during all ME burns at Saturn and pointing execution errors through mid-2011 show that this method of handling the pointing bias works well. 
V. Modeling Execution Errors
One method of modeling execution error is the Gates 8 method using a fixed term (e f ) and a term (e p ) that is proportional to burn ΔV magnitude. These two terms are independent so a one-sigma magnitude error is found by taking the root-sum-square of the two terms. Table 1 is based on fits of main engine magnitude execution error using the Gates model. Cassini execution error has improved since 2006 as Table  1 shows for burn magnitude error. The proportional error term has dropped from .04% to zero because in 2009 the accelerometer scale factor was adjusted in the FSW based on observed maneuver execution performance. The fixed error relates to a variety of factors, such as: (1) uncertainty in the main engine tailoff impulse; (2) uncertainty in the time delay between the last time the accelerometer was read and the time the main engine valve actually closes. One additional factor that affects the ΔV magnitude is the fact that after ME shutdown, RCS thrusters must fire to correct for any residual rates on the spacecraft, and keep the attitude control position American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics errors within a 2 mrad deadband. These post-burn thruster firings can impart up to 10 mm/s of ΔV in the burn direction but can vary considerably from one maneuver to the next. Main engine magnitude and pointing execution error capability has improved significantly since launch. Figures 12 and 13 show the evolution of ME execution error performance to date.
Figure 12. Main Engine Magnitude Execution Error. Uses the best fit Gates model given flight reconstructions up to that time.
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VI. RCS Maneuvers
RCS maneuvers are performed when the desired ΔV is less than what the main engine system can safely perform. The ΔV "cutoff" point, above which an ME burn is used, is discussed in Section VII. RCS maneuvers perform all maneuver roll and yaw turns in RWA control. This allows considerable hydrazine savings. Just before the RCS burn begins, a transition to RCS control is commanded and the RWAs are commanded to hold their current spin rate during the burn. No hardware accelerometer is used during RCS maneuvers (its accuracy is somewhat degraded for these low-acceleration burns). Instead, a "virtual accelerometer" is used which estimates thrust acceleration for each firing Z-thruster based on its on/off status, and on-board estimates (RCS block command parameters) of spacecraft mass and the nominal thrust for each thruster. From these quantities, the FSW computes an estimated acceleration for each firing thruster. In an RCS burn, all four Z-axis-facing thrusters are nominally firing together. Burn cutoff is commanded when the accumulated ΔV magnitude reaches the target. Without an explicit sensor, RCS burns are essentially "timed" burns where total thruster on-time is accumulated.
Attitude control deadbands of 0.5 degrees for the X and Y axes and 1 degree for the Z-axis are used during the RCS burn. When an X or Y deadband is reached, 2 of the 4 Z-thrusters pulse off to provide torque to reduce the attitude control error in that axis (if both deadbands are reached at the same time 1 of the 4 Z-thrusters pulses off). 
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This "off-pulsing" of the Z-thrusters is used for attitude control during the burn and is accounted for in the Delta V accumulator algorithm. Typically, off-pulsing accounts for about 10% of the burn duration (i.e. the thrusters are on about 90% of the time during the burn). Individual thrusters typically average between 80% and 100% "duty-cycle" on-time during RCS burns. The duty-cycles tend to be smaller the further away the center of mass is from the Zaxis centerline of the spacecraft.
The roll and yaw turn rates in RWA control are changeable depending on the RWA spin rate profiles during the slews. It is possible the OTM slews could cause an RWA to reach a momentum saturation rate of 2020 rpm. In that case, slowing the slew(s) could provide acceptable momentum margin. In other cases, increasing the slew rate(s) can help avoid dwelling for too long at a very low spin rate which could degrade RWA bearing lubricant.
After RCS burn cutoff, the spacecraft remains at the burn attitude for several minutes at the same deadbands as during the burn. Then the deadbands are reduced to 2 mrad about each axis in preparation for the transition back to RWA control. This deadband tightening is important for good RWA controller performance but it does introduce some additional ΔV at the burn attitude. Following transition back to RWA control, the unwind yaw turn is commanded to return the HGA to Earth-point. This is followed by the unwind roll turn to return to the initial attitude.
RCS burn magnitude execution errors at Saturn are plotted in Fig. 14. The figure depicts magnitude percentage error as a function of burn magnitude ΔV for all RCS burns at Saturn.
The Y-axis is V MAG / V CMD (where V MAG is magnitude execution error) expressed as a percentage. Because the accelerometer is not used for RCS burns, ΔV magnitude execution error is closely tied to a good FSW parameter estimate of RCS thrust force and spacecraft mass. These estimates are always updated prior to each RCS burn. There are several ways Cassini operations engineers track RCS thrust force. The first is reconstruction of the most
Figure 14. RCS Burn Magnitude Execution Errors at Saturn
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics RCS burn pointing execution error has improved steadily at Saturn, especially compared to burns performed prior to reaching Saturn. After launch, slews to the burn attitude were performed in RCS control to save time and reduce solar heating. But the 2 mrad deadbands used caused the initial attitude to sometimes be as much as 2.8 mrad from the desired thrust direction. Once the slews began being performed in RWA control, the attitude control error at burn ignition dropped essentially to zero. This was especially helpful during very short burns.
One aspect of the RCS ΔV controller FSW that reduces pointing error is the pulse adjuster. For a given spacecraft axis, when the attitude control error reaches the deadband, the pulse adjuster will off-pulse the thrusters longer to drive the attitude control error away from the deadband. The accumulated attitude control error is used as a gain term in the pulse adjuster. The more rapidly the attitude control error reaches a deadband, the longer the offpulse. The values of these integrators are carried over from one RCS burn to the next. This helps subsequent RCS burn avoid "riding the deadband" during the burn. This results in better pointing, longer off-pulses, and fewer total off-pulses. One RCS burn in November of 2010 had to be performed right after a FSW upload where the prime flight computer had been reset (causing the pulse adjuster attitude error gain to be reset to zero). The effect on burn performance was very noticeable: not only was pointing execution error degraded, but so was the magnitude error. The higher number of off-pulses led to greater errors in the total ΔV because of thruster impulse rise and tailoff uncertainties. Once the attitude control integrators were re-established via ground command, subsequent RCS burns were much more accurate. Attitude control errors during a recent RCS burn are plotted in Fig. 16 . 
VII. RCS versus Main Engine Delta V Cutoff Point
The relative maneuver execution errors of RCS versus ME burns play a role in deciding at what burn ΔV should an ME burn be implemented as opposed to an RCS burn. By co-plotting RCS and ME pointing execution error 1-sigma capabilities using current flight data, the cross-over point in ΔV magnitude above which ME burns are favored is seen in Fig. 17 to be about 0.33 m/s. The Cassini project has chosen 0.3 m/s to be the nominal ΔV magnitude cutoff point. Above 0.3 m/s ΔV magnitude, a main engine burn will be performed. Below 0.3 m/s, an RCS burn will be performed.
VIII. Conclusions
Over 200 Orbit Trim Maneuvers have been performed since arrival at Saturn in 2004. Execution errors have significantly improved between Saturn arrival and today. For main engine burns, small adjustments to the accelerometer scale factor have helped improve magnitude execution error. Main engine pointing error has been improved by careful updating of the main engine pre-aim vector. RCS burn magnitude execution error has been improved by updating the FSW estimate of the RCS thrust force based on reconstruction of the achieved burn ΔV using navigation radiometric data. RCS burn pointing execution error has improved because the flight software uses attitude control error accumulators in the pulse-adjuster logic to keep the thrust vector more closely centered on the desired burn direction. Other enhancements include delaying the post-burn return to RWA control during main
Figure 17. Overlay of Main Engine and RCS Burn Gates Model Execution Errors
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics engine ΔV maneuvers to allow dynamical oscillations to damp out (reducing the stress on the RWA hardware). These and other improvements increase the likelihood that the Saturn orbital mission can continue through September of 2017 by careful performance of perhaps 200 more ΔV maneuver.
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